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Federal Court Stays And Dismissals In Deference To
Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of
Colorado River
The federal courts have often attempted to define the circum-
stances in which they can decline to hear a case that meets the
jurisdictional requirements. An especially troublesome situation is
presented when a federal court action concerns a matter that is the
subject of parallel state court proceedings.' A stay or a dismissal of
the federal action would avoid friction between state and federal
courts, free litigants from the burden of duplicative litigation, pro-
mote efficient use of judicial resources, and, in some instances, re-
lieve overcrowded dockets.2 In spite of these advantages, the notion
The terms "parallel proceedings," "duplicative litigation," and "the exercise of concur-
rent jurisdiction," refer to the simultaneous prosecution of two or more suits in which at least
some of the issues and parties are so closely related that the judgment of one will necessarily
have a res judicata effect on the other. Res judicata effects are of two types. First, "claim
preclusion," as expressed in the rules of merger and bar, renders conclusive a valid and final
judgment. If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, his claim is extinguished and merged
into the judgment, and he may not maintain any further action on his original claim. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMrTS §§ 45(a), 47 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). Of course, if the
judgment is for the defendant the plaintiff's claim is extinguished. See id. §§ 45(b), 48. The
failure of the defendant to interpose a compulsory counterclaim precludes subsequent action
on that claim, even if judgment is for the defendant. See id. § 56.1(2). FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)
provides that:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.
As of the end of 1972 more than 30 states had similar counterclaim rules. Reporter's Note,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
Second, "issue preclusion," or collateral estoppel, makes a judgment conclusive as to any
issue actually litigated and determined when that issue was essential to the judgment. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 45(c), 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). The determina-
tion is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties on the same or a different claim.
See id. § 68.
Although the res judicata effect of a judgment cannot be determined until it is raised in
a subsequent suit, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1973), it is usually
apparent from the pleadings whether the parties and issues in the two suits are sufficiently
overlapping that the suits can be considered duplicative.
2 These concerns have motivated two commentators to suggest amendments to the Judi-
cial Code. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. II), 36 U. Cm.
L. REv. 268, 335 (1969) (recommending an amendment to provide that a state or federal court
stay any action filed if a prior suit concerning substantially the same issues and parties is
pending in another court, absent a showing that the second court can more fully decide the
controversy); Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Ab-
stention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959) (proposing an amendment to provide that federal
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persists that plaintiffs whose claims satisfy the jurisdictional re-
quirements have a right to a federal forum, and that federal courts
have a correlative obligation to hear all cases falling within their
jurisdiction.
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States,3 the lower federal
courts, in recognition of the inefficiencies of duplicative litigation,
liberally granted stays in deference to pending state court proceed-
ings. Development of the stay doctrine in the lower courts was
marked by inconsistency and confusion that left the ambit of the
power to stay unclear. In Colorado River the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that federal courts have power to stay proceedings in
deference to a parallel state suit in order to promote "wise judicial
administration." The Court articulated a balancing test to guide the
lower courts in the exercise of the power to stay: stays can properly
be granted when "exceptional circumstances" outweigh the obliga-
tion to exercise federal jurisdiction. The "exceptional circumstan-
ces" language suggests that the Court disapproves the readiness
with which the lower courts have granted stays.
This comment first describes the background of the Colorado
River decision by canvassing the problems involved in parallel suits,
the methods by which these problems are handled by state and
federal courts ifi contexts not requiring an abrogation of federal
jurisdiction, the related doctrines of abstention and forum non con-
veniens, and the development of the power to stay. Second, the
Colorado River decision is examined in detail. The third section of
the comment attempts to apply the reasoning of Colorado River to
other situations in which stays have been thought appropriate, and
suggests a framework consistent with that analysis for determining
the propriety of a stay.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER TO STAY AND RELATED
DOCTRINES
A. Duplicative Proceedings
There are three basic types of parallel or duplicative actions:
courts must stay proceedings if there is a prior state or federal suit pending).
Overcrowded dockets create a hazard that some claimholders will be unfairly delayed or
deterred from litigating by the fact that others are able to litigate their controversies in two
forums. Cf. Crawford v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 286 F. Supp. 556, 557-58 (S.D. Ga. 1968)
(to deny a stay in a parallel action would result in delaying other litigants who may have no
other available forum).
3 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
[44:641
19771 Federal Stays after Colorado River
repetitive suits, reactive suits, and multiple class proceedings.' Re-
petitive suits are multiple suits on the same claim filed by a plaintiff
against the same defendant in two or more forums. The reasons for
bringing repetitive suits include harassment, insurance against the
risk that the first court will not obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, 5 the benefits of forum shopping,6 or simply tactical ad-
vantage. A plaintiff might also file a second action in order to
circumvent an adverse ruling in the first suit that does not amount
to an adjudication on the merits.8
Reactive suits are suits filed by the defendant to the first action
against the plaintiff either seeking a declaration that he is not liable
to the plaintiff or asserting an affirmative claim that arises out of
or is intimately related to the same transaction or occurrence that
is the subject of the first action.9 Reactive suits are often brought
in order to obtain the supposed tactical advantages that inhere in
proceeding as a plaintiff,"' to take advantage of, or avoid, perceived
prejudices of a particular forum," or to take advantage of choice of
The repetitive/reactive terminology is taken from Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA
L. RFv. 525 (1960); Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REv. 11 (1961). Duplicative class
litigation can be either reactive or repetitive. For example, if the defendant in a plaintiff class
action sues the plaintiffs as a defendant class, his suit would be considered reactive. When
two plaintiff class actions are brought by different named plaintiffs, or an individual's com-
plaint is the subject of a pending class action, the suits are "repetitive" as the plaintiff in
the second suit presumably belongs to the class whose rights will be determined in the first
action. Repetitive class actions are classified separately as multiple class proceedings because
of special considerations not involved in the ordinary repetitive suit. See text and notes at
notes 181-199 infra.
5 See, e.g., O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328, 330 (10th Cir. 1972); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 72 F.R.D. 33, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
4 See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1203 (2d Cir. 1970);
Mars, Inc. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
1 Cf. Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1949) (stay conditioned on use
of federal discovery in state court action); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 758
(7th Cir. 1970) (same). But see Beard v. New York Central R.R., 20 F.R.D. 607, 610 (N.D.
Ohio 1957) (defendant not required to answer interrogatories since the plaintiff appeared to
be using the federal suit only as a "mere auxiliary forum" to assist in the preparation of the
state case).
" See, e.g., Graziano v. Pennell, 371 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1967) (preclusion order);
Beaver v. Borough of Johnsonburg, 375 F. Supp. 326, 328 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (dismissal on
ground of laches).
I Another form of reactive litigation is an interpleader action filed after an action has
been commenced against the interpleader plaintiff. See FED. R. Civ. P. 22; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335,
1397, 2361 (1970). The federal interpleader rules provide for the issuance of an injunction
against other suits by the court in which the interpleader action was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(1970). Since the injunction effectively eliminates the problems of duplicative litigation,
interpleader actions will not be discussed further.
See Vestal, Reactive Litigation, supra note 4, at 13-14.
See, e.g., Caribbean Sales Ass'n v. Hayes Indus., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 598 (D.P.R. 1967),
vacated, 387 F.2d 498 (1st Cir. 1968).
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law rules in the second forum that might result in the application
of more favorable substantive law. 2 If the defendant fears that liti-
gation in the plaintiff's chosen forum will proceed too slowly, he
might bring a reactive suit in order to have the matter resolved more
quickly. 3 The defendant may seek a federal forum in particular
because of advantages provided by federal procedure, 4 or because
he has a defense 5 or counterclaim"5 based on federal law.
The third category of duplicative litigation involves class action
litigation. Separate class actions or shareholder derivative suits may
be brought by different named plaintiffs, representing the same or
a similar class, on essentially the same cause of action. 7 The subject
matter of a class action may also be the subject of concurrent indi-
vidual suits,"' or vice versa. Multiple class proceedings often result
from the desire of individual class members to control the litiga-
tion 9 or to collect the substantial attorneys' fees awarded the plain-
tiff in a successful class suit.20
B. Stays and Dismissals in Contexts Not Requiring an Abrogation
of Federal Jurisdiction
Courts and legislatures have developed a variety of ways to
avoid the waste inherent in parallel proceedings. When the two
courts are of the same state, the second action will typically be
abated if both suits involve the same parties and subject matter and
if the parties' rights can be adequately adjudicated in the first ac-
tion.2' Abatement is, in effect, a dismissal and is available as a
matter of right.2 If the first suit is pending in the courts of another
state or in federal court, the state court in which the parallel action
is filed has discretionary authority to stay or dismiss the suit.2 3
12 See, e.g., PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 676 & nn.3 & 4
(5th Cir. 1973).
13 See, e.g., Applegate v. Devitt, 509 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1975).
14 See note 7 supra.
11 See, e.g., Shareholders Management Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971).
11 See, e.g., McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1975).
17 See, e.g., National Health Fed'n v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1975); Nelson
v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1962); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 403 F. Supt'.
961 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (class actions); Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971);
Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961) (stockholder derivative suits).
"1 See, e.g., Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
11 See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1318, 1414 (1976).
11 See id. at 1604-1618.
21 See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 232 So. 2d 370 (Miss. 1970); Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal. 2d 840, 168
P.2d 5 (1946).
22 See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 186 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
2 See, e.g., Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1976); McWane Cast Iron
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Priority of suit is usually the controlling factor.21
When both proceedings are in a single federal district court, 25
the two actions can be consolidated. 2 When two district courts are
involved, duplication can be avoided by transfer and consolida-
tion, 2 by an injunction issued in one suit to prevent the parties from
proceeding in the other,' or by a stay of proceedings pending resolu-
tion of the case in the other district.29 The case of Semmes Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 31 illustrates the general rule governing both
injunctions and stays. The plaintiffs sued Ford in a New Jersey state
court, seeking an injunction and a temporary restraining order. Ford
removed to federal district court and counterclaimed for amounts
paid to Semmes on allegedly fraudulent warranty refund claims.
Two months later, Semmes sued on the same cause of action in
Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Engineering Co., 263 A.2d 281 (Del. 1970).
Occasionally a state court will enjoin the prosecution of a parallel suit in another state
on a showing that the suit was brought in bad faith. See, e.g., O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 6
N.J. 170, 78 A.2d 64 (1951). While some injunctions are issued without a showing of bad faith,
see, e.g., Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 173 A.2d 225 (1961), state
courts are generally reluctant to enjoin in personam suits. See Comment, Anti-Suit Injunc-
tions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 471, 478-80 (1965). See generally
Dumbauld, Judicial Interference with Litigation in Other Courts, 74 DICK. L. REv. 369, 381-
82 (1970). State courts are without power to enjoin proceedings in federal courts, Donovan v.
City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). Federal injunctions against state proceedings are governed
by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), and the Supreme Court has held that
federal courts should not enjoin a concurrent state in personam suit, Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
21 See, e.g., Henry v. Stewart, 203 Kan. 289, 454 P.2d 7 (1969); Conrad v. West, 98 Cal.
App. 2d 116, 219 P.2d 477 (1950).
Several states have codified the practice of stays and dismissals of subsequently filed
suits. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. 27-1115 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10 (West 1973);
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-607 (1975); ILL. RV. STAT. ch. 110, § 48(1)(c) (1975). N.Y. Civ. PRAC. RULE
3211(a)(4) (McKinney 1970), New York's statute, provides that a party may move to dismiss
a cause on the ground that "there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States," and that on such a
motion the court "may make such order as justice requires."
1 When a federal court and a federal administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction
over a case, the court can invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to stay or dismiss the
suit before it. See generally L. JAnE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 121-51
(1965); K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAw TEXT 373-81 (1972).
2, FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1970). See Maxlow v. Leighton, 325 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Winsor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
2 See, e.g., Telephonics Corp. v. Lindly & Co., 291 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1961); 2 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.06[2], at 735-36 n.11 (2d ed. 1975).
2 See, e.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Landis
v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936). The existence of parallel proceedings may justify
dismissal of the second suit. See, e.g., Hammett v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d 145,
150 (2d Cir. 1949). But see id. at 152 (Clark, J., dissenting) (stay or transfer would have been
more appropriate).
- 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
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federal district court in New York. Ford moved for a stay in the New
York action. The district judge denied the motion, but the Second
Circuit reversed. Noting that the New Jersey district court could
have enjoined the prosecution of the New York action, the court
stated that since the requested stay would have the same practical
effect as an injunction, the stay motion should be decided under the
rule governing injunctions against suit: "Whatever the procedure,
the first suit should have priority, 'absent the showing of balance
of convenience in favor of the second action.' ,,3, The court found the
plaintiffs' preference for the New York action and their willingness
to drop the New Jersey suit an insufficient ground for departing
from the priority rule,"2 noting that instances in which the second
court should go forward would be "rare indeed. '1 3
C. Federal-State Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Absolute Right
Doctrine and Its Decline
In 1821 the Supreme Court stated in dictum that a federal court
has "no right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given. '34
The statement was repeated in subsequent cases.3 1 In the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries the lower federal courts adhered to
this strict rule.36 The rationale for the rule was that the jurisdic-
tional statutes grant a plaintiff whose action meets the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites an "absolute right" to bring suit in federal court
31 Id. at 1202 (quoting Remington Prods. Corp. v. American Aerovap, Inc., 192 F.2d 872,
873 (2d Cir. 1951)).
32 Id. at 1202-03. The Second Circuit considered the fact that Semmes's claims in the
New York action based on dealership termination were not before the New Jersey court to
be irrelevant, since the dealership termination claims constituted compulsory counterclaims
to Ford's counterclaim in the New Jersey action. Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1203. For a description of representative situations that justify departure from
the priority rule, see Mattel, Inc. v. Louis Marx & Co., 353 F.2d 421, 424 n.4 (2d Cir. 1965).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170,
175 (1857); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893). In McClellan, the Court
stated:
The rule is well recognized that the pendency of an action in the state court is no
bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdic-
tion. . . . [The circuit court of the United States had acquired jurisdiction, the issues
were made up, and when the State intervened the Federal court practically turned the
case over for determination to the state court. We think it had no authority to do this
217 U.S. at 282.
3 See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Miller, 91 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1937); Checker Cab Mfg.
Co. v. Checker Taxi Co., 26 F.2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 1928); Woren v. Witherbee, Sherman & Co.,
240 F. 1013, 1015 (N.D.N.Y. 1917). But see Butler v. Judge, 116 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir.
1941).
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and place on the court a corresponding obligation to proceed to
judgment.37 The Supreme Court, however, has held that in certain
contexts properly invoked jurisdiction can be abdicated.
1. Forum non conveniens. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,3 the
Supreme Court held that a federal district court can dismiss an
action pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Although
a strong dissent emphasized the "statutory duty" of a federal court
to exercise its jurisdiction, 9 the majority opinion summarily dis-
missed this articulation of the absolute right doctrine, stating that
the Court "has repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to
decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances."40 The doctrine of
forum non conveniens formulated in Gulf Oil allows a court in its
discretion to dismiss a suit properly before it when a different forum
is more convenient for the litigants4' or demanded by considerations
of public interest.2 The application of forum non conveniens does
not depend on the existence of a parallel suit; its rationale is that
the "necessary generality" of the venue statutes, which are drawn
broadly to assure plaintiffs a federal forum, can lead to abuse if
plaintiffs "resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconven-
ient place for an adversary."43
In practice, forum non conveniens seldom deprives plaintiffs of
a federal forum. The doctrine "presupposes at least two forums" in
which the defendant can be sued, and in the typical case at least
one of the alternative forums will be another federal court. When
the alternative forum is a federal district court, the case can be
transferred to another district or division "for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."44 The doctrine of
- Checker Cab Mfg. Co. v. Checker Taxi Co., 26 F.2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 1928). The court in
Checker Cab characterized the right to a federal forum as one guaranteed by the Constitution.
- 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
31 Id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 504.
" The Court listed as relevant such factors as "relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
unwilling, witnesses; possibility of view of premises . . . ; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." 330 U.S. at 508.
,1 These considerations include "administrative burdens on courts in congested centers;
burden of jury duty on the people of a community; local interest in having localized controver-
sies decided at home; appropriateness of having litigation in the state whose law applies so
as to avoid conflicts problems or problems of ascertaining foreign law." Id. at 508-09.
Id. at 507.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). A case can be transferred only to a district court where
the original action could have been brought. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-43
(1960) (venue objections cannot be waived by consent). When transfer is possible, a federal
court should not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. See Collins v. American Automo-
bile Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
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forum non conveniens can make a federal forum unavailable, how-
ever, in instances in which the only convenient alternative forum is
a foreign tribunal. 5 Some courts have ruled that a federal court may
dismiss even though the only alternative is a state court.4 However,
the recent revision of the venue statute to provide that an action
may be brought in the district "in which the claim arose"47 makes
a convenient federal forum available in all but rare cases.
2. The Abstention Doctrine. Perhaps the deepest encroach-
ment upon the absolute right doctrine has been the development of
the abstention doctrine. 8 Abstention is grounded upon principles of
comity and federalism and upon the principle that the federal
courts should avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication. The
Supreme Court in Meredith v. Winter Haven9 insisted that
"exceptional circumstances," in the form of "some recognized pub-
lic policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred," must be present in order to justify abstention." Justice
Brennan's opinion in Colorado River sets forth a comprehensive
categorization of the circumstances in which abstention is appropri-
ate.51
The first category, commonly termed Pullman abstention,5 2
applies "in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which
5 See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); Del Rio v. Ballenger Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (D.S.C.
1975).
11 There are very few reported instances of federal court dismissals when the only alterna-
tive forum was a state court. See Gross v. Owen, 221 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Simon v. Silfen,
247 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). At least one court has held that "the doctrine of forum
non conveniens does not contemplate a denial of plaintiff's right to bring her action in the
federal court." Burns v. Adam, 114 F. Supp. 355, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-1391(b) (1970).
See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 986-1009 (2d ed. 1973); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 at 218-36 (3d ed. 1976); Bezanson, Abstention: The
Supreme Court and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1974); Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974); Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1977);
Gowen & Izlar, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEx. L.
REV. 194 (1964).
4' 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
w Id. at 234. The requirement of "exceptional circumstances" has been repeated in
subsequent abstention decisions. See, e.g., Harris County Comm'rs Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S.
77, 83 (1975); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970); Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Propper v. Clark, 337
U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
11 424 U.S. at 813-17. Other categorizations have been offered. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT,
supra note 48; Bezanson, supra note 48.
52 The leading case is Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court
determination of pertinent state law. '5 3 The parties are usually or-
dered to repair to state court for a resolution of the state law issues.54
Pullman abstention is ordered only when the state law is unclear.5"
The rationale underlying this type of abstention is analogous to that
underlying the ripeness doctrine: the desire to avoid unnecessarily
deciding a constitutional question,56 or to "educate" an unavoidable
decision by allowing the state court to articulate the relevant state
policy and perhaps eliminate certain issues from the case."7
Justice Brennan's second category of abstention, suits present-
ing "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result
in the case then at bar, 5 8 focuses on cases in which federal adjudica-
tion would interfere with an important state governmental function.
This "exceptional circumstance" is based on a recognition that ad-
judication functions in some public law controversies to formulate
and articulate state policy, a function more appropriately dis-
charged by the state courts." Federal court adjudication would be
"disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy" in an area
entrusted to state regulation and control."0
424 U.S. at 814 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
189 (1959)).
1 The federal court action is stayed during the state court proceeding. A party is not
required to submit his federal claims to the state court but may instead reserve those conten-
tions and return to federal court following the state court's determination of the state law
issues. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
u See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 357 U.S. 77, 84 (1958). The mere
difficulty of ascertaining state law does not ordinarily justify abstention. See Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). Recent cases, however, suggest that if a court can
certify the state law questions to the highest state court, abstention is permissible. See
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91
(1974); United Servs. Life Ins. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964).
54 But see Bezanson, supra note 48, at 1112 (arguing that there is "little reason" not to
extend Pullman abstention to any case where the resolution of a state law issue might dispose
of a question arising under a federal statute).
Bezanson, supra note 48, at 1112, 1118-19.
424 U.S. at 814.
5, Bezanson, supra note 48, at 1124. Bezanson lists the following characteristics the Court
has considered in determining whether the state governmental interest will justify abstention:
1) involvement of "the state's interest in regulating and preserving important natural re-
sources"; 2) the existence of "established state regulatory systems, with a history of state
judicial experience reviewing cases arising under that system"; 3) involvement of "areas of
traditional state power, such as eminent domain or public education"; and 4) in the absence
of an established regulatory system, the existence of a "very high possibility of an intrusive
federal adjudication severely handicapping state government." Id. at 1123.
" 424 U.S. at 814. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the Court held that
the district court should have dismissed a suit brought to enjoin enforcement of an adminis-
trative order of the Texas Railroad Commission. Texas had established a system of adminis-
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The doctrines of Younger v. Harris" and Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.62 are the basis of the third branch of abstention, which requires
a federal court to dismiss a suit when jurisdiction has been invoked
to restrain a state criminal proceeding 3 or a civil proceeding in
which the state has a substantial interest. 4 The doctrine does not
apply if the state proceedings are marked by bad faith, or if the
challenged state statute is patently invalid. The justification for
declining to exercise jurisdiction in this circumstance is based on
principles of equity jurisdiction and considerations of comity and
federalism. If the federal plaintiff can assert his federal claim as a
defense in the state proceeding, "traditional equity jurisprudence"
indicates that a court of equity should not grant relief, since the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law.65 Federal court inter-
trative decision-making and judicial review to regulate oil production and manage oil and gas
fields. The Court held, "[t]hese questions of regulation . . . so clearly involves [sic] basic
problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas
courts the first opportunity to consider them." 319 U.S. at 332. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
48, at 222 (describing Burford abstention as a self-imposed restraint "to avoid needless
conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs").
It 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
62 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Justice Brennan's categorization of the Younger and Huffman
doctrines as abstention doctrines, 424 U.S. at 816, is somewhat novel. See Bartels, Avoiding
a Comity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "'Interfere" with
State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REv. 27, 30 n.11 (1976). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra
note 48, § 52A; Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. Rlv. 591
(1975); Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical
Analysis, 1976 DuKF, L.J. 523.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
1 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1975). In Huffman, the Court extended
Younger only to federal actions seeking to restrain state civil actions that are "in aid of and
closely related to" state criminal proceedings and upheld the dismissal of a § 1983 action
challenging the use of state nuisance statutes to close a pornographic movie theater. But in
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), the Court held that the district court should have
dismissed a § 1983 challenge to civil contempt procedures authorized by New York statutes.
The state interest in the "regular operation of its judicial system" was "of sufficiently great
import" to require the application of Huffman abstention, regardless of whether the state
proceeding was civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal. Id. at 1217. See also Trainor v. Hernandez,
97 S. Ct. 1911 (1977) (Huffman principle is applicable to federal court interference with state
civil enforcement action brought by the state in its sovereign capacity).
,1 Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975) (abstention is inappropriate where chal-
lenge raised issue that could not be asserted as a defense in state prosecution).
Suits seeking declaratory judgments concerning the constitutionality of a criminal stat-
ute brought by persons threatened with prosecution for its violation are not precluded if no
prosecution is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is brought. Steffel v. Thomp-
son, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). Injunctive relief is also available if no state suit is pending. Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1975). But see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)
(holding that the federal courts must decline to hear civil rights cases that interfere with state
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ference with state proceedings also contravenes the principles of
comity, which require that the courts of one sovereignty respect the
proceedings of another.6 While the application of this branch of
abstention to civil proceedings is still unclear, 7 it appears to be
restricted to cases in which the concurrent state proceeding involves
important state interests, and in which federal adjudication would
impair the state's ability to vindicate those interests.
The abstention decisions substantially limit a litigant's right to
a federal court adjudication of his entire civil action. The abstention
doctrine, however, does not reflect concern with the problems of
duplicative litigation." In practice, abstention often delays the reso-
lution of suits and results in duplication of effort. 0
3. Stays in special contexts. Prior to the decision in Colorado
River, the Supreme Court recognized a federal court's power to
dismiss or stay proceedings in deference to a pending state court
action in several limited situations. When both proceedings are in
rem or quasi in rem, dismissal of the federal suit is justified by the
rule that possession of the res vests the court with the exclusive
power to determine all related controversies. 7' The Court's applica-
prosecutions if the state action was begun before the federal court held "proceedings of
substance on the merits," even if the federal suit was filed first).
" The basic principle of comity is that the system of federalism "will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways." Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 601 (1975)). Three comity-based concerns are raised when a federal court is asked to
interfere with a state criminal proceeding: 1) duplication of effort; 2) negative reflection on
the competency of the state court; and 3) disruption of the state's criminal justice system.
Bartels, supra note 62, at 43.
The recognition of a strong policy against duplicative suits in this context would have
important implication for parallel jurisdiction problems in a private law context. However,
the Court has treated this policy as relatively weak in relation to the other comity concerns.
See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1975); Bartels, supra note 62, at 42 n.76.
'1 In Vail the Court reserved the question of the applicability of Younger to all civil
litigation. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.13 (1977).
" The notion of comity, "a proper respect for state functions," Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971), would seem irrelevant unless the state has some institutional stake in the
proceedings. In Vail, the Court emphasized the "State's interest in the contempt process."
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977). See Trainor v. Hernandez, 97 S. Ct. 1911, 1920-21
(1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of
Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 523, 555-58. But see text and notes
at notes 169-170, 175 infra.
99 With the exception of Younger cases, the abstention doctrine does not require the
existence of a parallel state suit.
7' The England doctrine, see note 54 supra, has led to great delays and extensive litiga-
tion in cases proceeding under Pullman abstention. See Comment, Abstention: A Case
Against Forum-Shuttling, 22 J. PuB. L. 439, 446-49 (1973); Note, Consequences of Abstention
by a Federal Court, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1358 (1960).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477-78 (1936).
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tion of this rule to federal-state concurrent proceeding had two ra-
tionales: the principle that the first court must control the res in
order "to grant the relief sought," and a comity-based notion that
dismissal by the federal court serves "to conciliate the distinct and
independent tribunals of the States and of the Union" by preventing
the friction that would result from the concurrent exercise of control
over the same res.72
The Supreme Court has also sanctioned the use of stays in
certain admiralty actions. In Langnes v. Green,3 plaintiff shipowner
brought suit in federal district court to establish a limitation of
liability pursuant to federal statute. The grant of federal maritime
jurisdiction then in effect conferred jurisdiction over admiralty
cases, "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it. ' ' 74 The dis-
trict court enjoined the defendant's concurrent personal injury ac-
tion in state court and proceeded to judgment, even though the state
action had been filed first. The Supreme Court in Langnes ruled
that the district court should have stayed itself, because the exercise
of federal jurisdiction in such circumstances would interfere with
the pending state court action and thus frustrate the purpose of the
"'savings" clause.75
When federal jurisdiction is predicated on the Declaratory
Judgment Act,7 6 stays in deference to state court proceedings have
been approved on the ground that the federal court's assumption of
jurisdiction to hear such cases is discretionary.77 In the leading case
of Brilihart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America,'7 8 Justice Frank-
furter indicated that the federal court should stay a declaratory
judgment action when "another suit is pending in a state court
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between
the same parties. '7 9
Thus, prior to Colorado River, the Court had approved stays or
dismissals in deference to pending state proceedings in certain spe-
cial situations, but had not articulated any single overarching doc-
7 Id. at 477 (quoting Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 595 (1857)).
73 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
7' 28 U.S.C. § 41(3) (1925), now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
- 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931).
76 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970).
,7 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) reads: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction
any court of the United States . . .may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration .... " [emphasis supplied].
78 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
7" Id. at 495. The Court characterized the declaratory judgment action as "[giratuitous
interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation."
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trine concerning the propriety of stays.80 The Court had sanctioned
stays in these special contexts, as it had approved stays and dis-
missals pursuant to the abstention and forum non conveniens doc-
trines, only because a strong countervailing policy or some specific
statutory authorization justified relaxing the obligation of federal
courts to exercise their jurisdiction.'
D. The Propriety of Stays: Lower Court Doctrine Before Colorado
River
The lower federal courts have adopted various approaches to
the problem of concurrent state and federal actions on the same
matter in cases not presenting any of the special circumstances
recognized by the Supreme Court as justifying a stay or dismissal.
The Tenth Circuit," and possibly the Third83 and Eighth84 Circuits,
adhere to the view that stays are not justified unless explicitly war-
ranted by Supreme Court precedent. A plurality of the circuits have
adopted a broad discretionary standard and have upheld stays in
' Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965), occasionally considered an abstention case, see
Bezanson, supra note 48, at 1113-14 n.35, is perhaps better viewed as one of the "isolated
contexts" in which the Court has approved stays. See D. CURRm, FEDERAL CouRTs 681-82 (2d
ed. 1976); text and notes at notes 212-213 infra. However, Scott did not involve true parallel
litigation, as the parties to the two suits were different. Both the state and federal courts had
already determined that the apportionment of the Illinois Senate was unconstitutional; the
remaining issue was whether the federal court should continue to exercise jurisdiction to
ensure enforcement of the judgment.
"I Cf. Currie, The Supreme Court and Federal Jurisdiction: 1975 Term, 1976 S. CT. RzV.
183, 214-15:
The Court used to say that when a statute gave jurisdiction a court could not refuse to
exercise it . . . . The abstention doctrine is basically in conflict with this principle; so
is forum non conveniens. The former doctrine, however, generally preserves the right to
return to federal court, and the latter to sue in federal court elsewhere. . . . [M]ost of
the time the Court at least has been fairly careful to confine the cases in which jurisdic-
tion will not be exercised within fairly narrow and specific categories.
A2 See, e.g., United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd, Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d
145 (10th Cir. 1970); Lutes v. United States Dist. Ct., 306 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 941 (1962). But see O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1972),
approving a stay in a repetitive suit in which the plaintiff was uncertain of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in the first suit and filed the second suit as protection against
the expiration of the statute of limitations.
14 See Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A., 526 F.2d 537, 542 n.1 (3d Cir.
1975) ("Whether in a case of fully concurrent jurisdiction. . . a stay of the federal case which
deprives a litigant of the choice of a federal forum would be proper. . . is an issue we do not
here decide."). But see Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers' Int'l Union, 544 F.2d 1207, 1215
(3d Cir. 1976) (dictum); Chintala v. Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (the power to stay is within the
discretion of the trial court).
I" See, e.g., Applegate v. Devitt, 509 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1975).
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deference to state proceedings in a variety of circumstances.
The broad discretionary standard was first announced by the
Second Circuit in the landmark case of Mottolese v. Kaufman.5
That case came up on a mandamus petition to vacate a district
court stay 6 of a shareholder derivative suit that had been brought
while a consolidated action concerning the same claims and sub-
stantially the same defendants was pending in state court. Judge
Learned Hand's majority opinion relied on the abstention and dec-
laratory judgment decisions to support the assertion that "[tihere
can be no doubt . .. that [the notion that there is an absolute
privilege of access to federal courts] is no longer true."8 Emphasiz-
ing the "power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
the causes on its docket, 8 8 the court drew an analogy between the
power to stay and the forum non conveniens doctrine89 and con-
cluded that an order to stay a federal court action was a matter for
176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
The reviewability of stay orders is no longer a controversial issue. See Note, Appellate
Review of Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 518 (1972). The Note's
conclusion, that petitions for writs of mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1970), are at present the "most productive channel" for review, is borne out in the caselaw.
Some earlier cases limited mandamus to cases not involving the exercise of discretion, thus
excluding stay orders from review through the writ, see RCA v. Igoe, 217 F.2d 218 (7th Cir.
1954). This limitation is no longer followed by the lower federal courts. Cf. LaBuy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (mandamus is available in situations requiring
"supervision" of the lower federal courts); Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423
U.S. 336 (1976) (writ used to order a district court to reinstate a removed case that had been
remanded to state court on improper grounds). Use of the writ to review grants of stays is
accepted practice in some circuits. See, e.g., Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A.,
526 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1975); Thompson v. Boyle, 417 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 972 (1970); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963). Other
approaches to reviewability are used in some situations, such as a finding of effective finality
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), see Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967), and
certification under § 1292(b), see Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964).
See also Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726, 729-32 (5th Cir. 1976); Field, The Abstention
Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. Rv. 590, 592-601 (1977); AMERIcAN LAW INsTrTUTE, STUDY OF
THE DmsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs 291-92 (1969).
176 F.2d at 302.
'Id. at 303 (quoting Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (holding
that a federal district court has power to stay proceedings when a parallel suit is pending in
another federal court)).
a "[wie can see no difference in kind between the inconveniences which may arise from
compelling a defendant to stand trial at a distance from the place where the transactions have
occurred, and compelling him to defend another action on the same claim." 176 F.2d at 303.
The dissent convincingly argued for a clear "difference in kind": relegating the litigant to a
state court is easily distinguishable from forcing him to bring another action in a different
federal district court. See id. at 307 (Frank, J., dissenting); cf. Washington v. General Motors
Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that the exercise of discre-
tion to decline cases brought under their original jurisdiction was justified in part because of
"the availability of the federal district court as an alternative forum."
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the discretion of the trial court. The only issue facing the appellate
court was, therefore, whether that discretion had been abused. The
court stated that the Supreme Court's abstention decision in
Meredith v. Winter Haven" required that the defendant show some
"positive reason" to stay the federal action. In Judge Hand's view,
the mere fact of duplication supplied that reason, for "equity has
always interfered to prevent multiplicity of suits."9' The court saw
no reason to prefer the federal suit, since there had been no showing
that it would come to trial earlier than the state court action. Be-
cause the state court's discovery procedure was inadequate, how-
ever, the Second Circuit conditioned the stay on the defendants'
consent to the use of the federal discovery rules in the state litiga-
tion. 2
The Mottolese analysis, particularly in its use of Meredith, in-
dicates that the court considered the power to stay pending the
termination of state court proceedings to be an aspect of the absten-
tion doctrine. Several later Second Circuit cases make this assump-
tion explicit." Judge Hand equated Meredith's "exceptional cir-
cumstances" with a showing of some "positive reason" to support a
stay. The Mottolese dissent emphasized that the two formulations
were different, arguing that the mere existence of a parallel suit
might constitute a "positive reason" to stay but not an "exceptional
circumstance."94 Subsequent cases interpret Mottolese as granting
the trial judge substantial discretion in deciding whether to issue a
stay. 5
Three other circuits have recognized a broad discretionary
power to stay. In the case of Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer,5 the
" 320 U.S. 228 (1943), discussed at text and notes at notes 49-50 supra.
" 176 F.2d at 303. The equity courts' practice of protecting defendants from vexatious
litigation developed shortly after the resolution of the common law equity conflict in 1616.
The courts required a defendant to demonstrate hardship beyond the pendency of another
action. See Dumbauld, Judicial Interference with Litigation in Other Courts, 74 DICK. L. REv.
369, 375-83 (1970); Note, Appellate Review of Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 518, 520-21 (1972). See also 176 F.2d at 307 (Frank, J., dissenting) (the presence of
one other suit is a "slim basis" for invoking the multiplicity of suits doctrine).
,2 176 F.2d at 304. This aspect of the decision has been criticized as encouraging duplica-
tive actions solely to procure federal discovery and as an unwarranted intrusion on the state
legislature's right to prescribe state judicial procedure. See Note, Power to Stay Federal
Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J. 978 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
" See, e.g., Universal Gypsum of Georgia, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp.
824 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
' 176 F.2d at 306 (Frank, J., dissenting).
, See, e.g., Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1970); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v.
McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951).
"1 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970). Aetna State Bank was overruled in Calvert Fire Ins. Co.
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Seventh Circuit reasoned that the power to stay constitutes an as-
pect of the abstention doctrine and invoked the "ever increasing
workload of our courts" as a basis for viewing a parallel state court
proceeding as an "exceptional circumstance."97 The Fourth Circuit
has reached an identical result on similar reasoning. In Weiner v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co.9 the Ninth Circuit also adopted a broad
discretionary standard, but did not rely on an equation of parallel
jurisdiction and abstention."' The Weiner court found that the re-
strictions on the abstention doctrine imposed by the Supreme Court
in Meredith v. Winter Haven"'0 have no application to stays in cases
involving a pending state proceeding, since abstention is not depen-
dent on parallel litigation.10° The concerns that counsel against the
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction-friction between the courts,
waste of judicial resources, burdens on the litigants, and the un-
seemliness of a race to judgment-are generally absent in cases
raising the question of abstention, for abstention operates to
"relegat[e] the parties to an as yet uncommenced action in the
state courts.' 1 3 The court thought that these distinctive considera-
tions are sufficient to justify a separate doctrine allowing trial courts
to stay proceedings pending the resolution of parallel state litiga-
tion.
The courts that recognize broad trial court discretion have at-
tempted to identify the factors relevant to the decision whether to
stay."4 The most significant factors are the similarity of issues and
v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977). See note 153 infra.
'7 430 F.2d at 756. Reliance on the crowded dockets of the district courts to justify staying
a federal suit is suspect in light of Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336,
344 (1976), in which the Court held that a federal district court could not remand a properly
removed action to state court on the ground that it was "too busy" to try the case without
causing undue delay. See also Ashman, Alfini & Shapiro, Federal Abstention: New Perspec-
tives on Its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629, 652 (1975).
"0 Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1967). But see Cunningham v. Ford Motor
Co., 413 F. Supp. 1101, 1106 (D.S.C. 1976) (apparently limiting Amdur to its facts).
" 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975).
'® Until 1975 the Ninth Circuit denied the existence of a general power to stay, for
reasons paralleling the Tenth Circuit's. See, e.g., Lecor, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 502
F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1974); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 824-28 (9th Cir. 1963).
101 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
1" 521 F.2d at 820.
' Id. at 821.
I The most comprehensive collection of the factors involved in ruling on stays is in
Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 10 (1970). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLE, FEDERAL PRcACICE &
PROcEDURE § 1838 (1972); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently
Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. Rav. 684, 698-710 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Columbia Note]; Yale Note, supra note 92, at 983-91.
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parties in the two suits,' ° the priority of the actions in time,," the
good faith of the litigants,'7 and the basis of federal jurisdiction
asserted.' 8 The courts have generally refused to adopt per se rules,' 9
and instead leave the determination to a balancing of all the fac-
tors."0
The Fifth Circuit has taken a distinctive approach to the paral-
lel proceedings problem, an approach that rejects both the permis-
sive view endorsed by a plurality of the circuits and the strict con-
servative view epitomized by the Tenth Circuit."' In Thompson v.
Boyle," 2 the court refused to issue a writ of mandamus to vacate a
stay pending the disposition of a parallel action in the Louisiana
state court. The Fifth Circuit found "compelling reasons" for the
' See, e.g., Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1955); Beaver v Borough of Johnsonburg, 375 F. Supp. 326 (W.D.
Pa. 1974); Levy v. Alexander, 170 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
'I" See, e.g., Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970); Universal
Gypsum of Georgia, Inc. v. American Cynamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Crawford v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 286 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
'" See, e.g., Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967); Mars, Inc. v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Some courts apparently feel that repetitive
suits are more likely to be brought in bad faith than reactive suits. Cf. Rosenfeld v. Black,
445 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.) ("We unreservedly condemn this practice
[filing suits in both state and federal courts] which, for reasons that are well understood, is
so frequently utilized in stockholder actions in the Southern District of New York").
'" If the case is within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the courts are reluctant to grant a
stay. See Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A., 526 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1975); Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Cove Vitamin & Pharmaceutical, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
But see Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1970); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer,
430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
Where jurisdiction is predicated solely on diversity of citizenship and only state law
issues are involved, the courts are usually receptive to a motion to stay. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Dansker, 68 F.R.D. 184, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Universal Gypsum of Georgia, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Crawford v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 286 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
For a discussion of the relevance of the basis of federal jurisdiction to the decision to grant
a stay, see text and notes at notes 215-217 infra.
'I" But see Universal Gypsum of Georgia, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp.
824, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (adopting a rule that a district court will order a stay when an in-
state plaintiff brings a diversity action raising only state law issues and a previously or
simultaneously commenced action is pending in the courts of his own state).
11 For example, several courts have granted stays without requiring the parties to be the
same or the issues to be identical if the parallel state proceeding will resolve major issues or
defenses and facilitate the litigation of the federal suit. See, e.g., Klein v. Walston & Co.,
432 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1970); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 403 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.
Ga. 1975).
M Some district courts in the Fifth Circuit apparently use the discretionary standard in
ruling on motions to stay. See Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 403 F. Supp. 961, 964
(N.D. Ga. 1975); Crawford v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 286 F. Supp. 556, 557 (S.D. Ga.
1968).
112 417 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970).
19771
The University of Chicago Law Review
stay, since the federal court could not completely dispose of the
matters in controversy.13 PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil
Co. " further expands this approach. PPG brought a diversity suit
in federal district court in Louisiana, seeking a declaration of con-
tractual rigl4ts and an injunction restraining Conoco from breaching
the contract." 5 Conoco had previously sued PPG and another major
customer in Texas state court for a judgment declaring that it was
not in breach of contract. The district court rejected PPG's claim
that Meredith v. Winter Haven"' precluded the federal courts from
staying proceedings in deference to a state court action. The court
interpreted Meredith as simply affirming "the mandatory nature of
diversity jurisdiction . . . [and making] clear that in equity suits
only 'exceptional circumstances' could justify a discretionary re-
fusal to exercise that jurisdiction.""' 7 Although Meredith had not
listed the pendency of a parallel state court action as an exceptional
circumstance, its list was not necessarily exhaustive. The court
viewed the Supreme Court's decision in Brillhart v. Excess Insur-
ance Co. " as recognizing that the strong policy against duplicative
litigation justifies declining the exercise of federal jurisdiction in
cases in which the federal action is for a declaratory judgment.
Pointing out that injunctive relief, like declaratory relief, is discre-
tionary,"9 the PPG court concluded that the considerations favoring
stays where the federal action is declaratory similarly justify a dis-
cretionary power to stay injunctive actions in deference to parallel
state proceedings.2 0 The court affirmed the district court's exercise
"I Id. at 1042.
" 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973), noted in 51 Tax. L. Rav. 1252 (1973).
' Id. at 675-78. The court noted that the request for injunctive relief distinguished the
case from BrilIhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), which held that a federal court
had discretion to decline jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment suit when parallel proceedings
are pending in state court. 478 F.2d at 679. Brilihart is discussed in text and notes at notes
76-79 supra.
II 320 U.S. 228 (1943), discussed in text and notes at notes 49-50 supra.
478 F.2d at 678.
28 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
22 478 F.2d at 681 (quoting Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 431, 436 (1948), and
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)).
I" This conclusion ignores h critical distinction between the declaratory judgment and
abstention theories-the exercise of jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act is ex-
pressly discretionary. See note 77 supra; Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Ac-
tions for Declaratory Judgments, 26 MIN. L. REv. 677, 692 (1942):
[The] considerations which led to the adoption of the declaratory action, namely,
convenience, expediency, need, desirability, public interest or policy . . . necessarily
import the employment of discretion, so that as opposed to the general though by no
means universal rule in action* at law or in equity, the action for a declaratory judgment
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of the stay power, because the state suit had been filed prior to the
federal action, some of the parties to the state suit were not before
the federal court, and there was no indication that a stay would be
"unfair" to PPG. 2'
Thus, by the time the Supreme Court finally came to consider
the power of federal courts to stay themselves in deference to paral-
lel state proceedings, the trend in the lower courts was toward broad
stay power.' 22 The lower court decisions had thoroughly explored the
possible approaches, and those circuits that recognized a broad
power to stay had delineated appropriate considerations to guide its
exercise.
II. COLORADO RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT V. UNITED
STATES
The stay question reached the Supreme Court in the 1976 case
of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States.'23
The case was unusual in many respects, and its background de-
serves detailed explication. The controversy began when the United
States brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaration of
certain water rights. Federal jurisdiction was based on section 1345
of the Judicial Code, which vests the district courts with original
jurisdiction of suits brought by the United States. '24 The Colorado
River Water Conservation District intervened as a defendant in
order to file a motion to dismiss, and other intervenors followed.
Two months after federal suit was brought, one of the intervenors
filed a motion in a state forum, Colorado Water Division 7,'2 seeking
to join the United States in proceedings to adjudicate the same
in the federal courts does not lie automatically but only where a useful purpose will be
served.
The PPG court expressly refused to decide whether the pendency of a state court action
would constitute an exceptional circumstance in a legal action. 478 F.2d at 681-82.
21 478 F.2d at 683.
22 Besides the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, other courts appear to have
implicitly recognized a discretionary power to stay. See Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 10, 30-33
(1970); Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952); In re
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 149 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1945); Reiter v. Universal
Marian Corp., 173 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1959), vacated as moot, 273 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
1- 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
124 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970) provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of
Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits, or
proceedings commenced by the United States .... "
21 Each of Colorado's seven water divisions determines water claims and administers
distribution for one or more of the larger river basins in the state. The statutory scheme is
contained in Colorado's Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969. CoLo.
REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 602 (1973 & Supp. 1976).
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water rights involved in the federal suit. The United States was
joined as a defendant and served with process pursuant to the
McCarran Amendment,'28 by which the federal government con-
sents to be sued in proceedings for the adjudication or administra-
tion of "rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source.''27 A motion to dismiss was then filed in the district court,
on the ground that the McCarran Amendment precludes federal
courts from assuming jurisdiction over water rights cases. The dis-
trict court did not decide this issue, but granted the motion on
abstention grounds.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit reversed,' 28 holding that the
McCarran Amendment simply allowed the Government to be joined
as a defendant in a state water rights action in which it was a
necessary party and did not by implication prohibit the United
States from litigating its water rights as a plaintiff in a federal
court. 2 1 The court also concluded that the district court should not
have abstained, emphasizing that the federal action had been filed
first and that jurisdiction was based on the presence of the United
States as plaintiff.3 °
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision. Although the Court agreed that abstention was inappro-
priate on the facts of the case 13' and that the McCarran Amendment
126 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). The relevant portions of the statute are:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudica-
tion of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the adminis-
tration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in
the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law, by purchase, by
exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstan-
ces . . . .
'I 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970). Consent to suit under the McCarran Amendment applies
to the adjudication of the United States' reserved water rights, as well as to rights acquired
under state law. See United States v. District Ct., 401 U.S. 520 (1971). Proceedings under
Colorado's Water Rights Determination and Administration Act are within the scope of the
McCarran Amendment. See United States v. District Ct., 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
' United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
129 Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 121-22.
' Abstention was arguably proper because of the presence of "difficult questions of state
law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the
result in the case then at bar," 424 U.S. at 814. See text and notes at notes 58-60 supra. In
fact, the parties argued the case on abstention grounds and the briefs did not discuss the
parallel proceedings issue. The federal action involved water claims based on both state and
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did not preclude the United States from suing in federal court,'32 the
Court ruled that the district court's dismissal of the action was
nonetheless proper. The Court distinguished parallel jurisdiction
problems from the considerations underlying the abstention doc-
trine:
Although this case falls within none of the abstention catego-
ries, there are principles unrelated to considerations of proper
constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state rela-
tions which govern in situations involving the contempora-
neous exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, either by federal
courts or by state and federal courts. These principles rest on
considerations of "[w]ise judicial administration, giving re-
gard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive
disposition of litigation. 1 33
The Court stated that when the parallel action is in a state court,
the power to dismiss in deference to the parallel proceeding is lim-
ited by the "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them. ' 134 The circumstances that jus-
tify dismissal in deference to a state proceeding must, therefore, be
"exceptional,' ' 3 and "the circumstances permitting the dismissal
of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding
for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more
limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention."' 36 The
Court then enumerated factors relevant to the determination of
whether "exceptional circumstances" exist, including the friction
that attends the exercise by two courts of concurrent jurisdiction
over a single res, 37 the relative inconvenience of the federal forum,13
the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation,' 3 and the order of
federal law. However, the applicable state law was clear-Colorado applied the doctrine of
prior appropriation-and a federal decision on the state claims would not "impair efforts to
implement state policy." 424 U.S. at 815. Although the federal claims might "conflict with
similar rights based on state law . . . [the] mere potential for a conflict in the results of
adjudications" did not warrant abstention. Id. at 815-16.
"I All nine justices agreed with the Tenth Circuit's analysis.
113 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S.
180, 183 (1952)). Kerotest upheld a stay issued in deference to an action pending in another
federal district court. The opinion emphasized the "ample degree of discretion . . . [which]
must be left to the lower courts." 342 U.S. at 183-84.
"1 424 U.S. at 817.
lu Id. at 818.
I /d.
" See text and notes at notes 71-72 supra.
"3 424 U.S. at 818 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), discussed in
text and notes at notes 38-47 supra).
13, 424 U.S. at 818 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), discussed in
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commencement of the respective suits.""
In Colorado River the decisive factor in favor of a stay was
"[tihe clear federal policy" evinced by the McCarran Amendment:
"the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river
system."' 4 The Court analogized the policy of the McCarran
Amendment to the basis of the rule that in in rem cases jurisdiction
must be yielded to the court that first acquired control over the res.
In both in rem and water rights cases, the Court stated, the goal is
to avoid "the generation of additional litigation through permitting
inconsistent dispositions of property.'1 2 The opinion noted four
additional factors supporting the district court's dismissal:' 4 the
federal action had not proceeded beyond the filing of the complaint;
"the extensive involvement of state water rights occasioned by this
suit"; the distance-300 miles-between the Denver district court
and the court in Division 7; and the Government's participation in
similar proceedings in other Colorado courts.'
In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, agreed that abstention was inappropriate, but viewed that
determination as leading "ineluctably to the conclusion that the
District Court was wrong in dismissing the complaint."' Justice
text and notes at notes 76-79 supra).
140 424 U.S. at 818 (citing Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 447 (1916)).
141 424 U.S. at 819.
112 Id. "This concern is heightened with respect to water rights, the relationships among
which are highly interdependent." But see text and notes at notes 147-49 infra.
,13 Although the Court's discussion never mentions a stay of the federal action as an
alternative to dismissal, the analysis is equally applicable to determining the propriety of a
stay. The technical distinction that a stay does not involve relinquishing jurisdiction but
merely postpones its exercise is of little practical importance. A stay in deference to parallel
proceedings will usually have the same effect as a dismissal because of the effects of res
judicata. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977); PPG Industries, Inc.
v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 1973); Ashman, Alfini & Shapiro, Federal
Abstention: New Perspectives on its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629, 639 (1975). But see
C. WRIGHT, supra note 60, at 228 ("there is enough. . . arguable difference between a 'stay
and a dismissal, that the propriety of this possible fourth abstention doctrine cannot b
regarded as finally settled").
Stays are usually preferred over dismissals since the parties can easily reopen the federal
suit if the state suit should prove inadequate to resolve the controversy, or if the state
judgment leaves issues before the federal court unresolved. In several cases appellate courts
have modified the district court's dismissal to provide that the action be stayed. See, e.g.,
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1931); McGreghar Land Co. v. Meguiar, 521 F.2d
822 (9th Cir. 1975); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1970).
In Colorado River there was no need to leave open the door to the federal court, since
there was no danger that the state judgment would not encompass all the issues and parties
before the federal court.
"1 424 U.S. at 820. The dissent characterized these additional factors as "insubstantial."
See id. at 823-24 n.6 (Stewart, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
"I Id. at 821.
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Stewart criticized the majority's reliance on the in rem precedents
to support the dismissal of an in personam action. He argued that
the in rem doctrine "applies only when exclusive control over the
subject matter is necessary to effectuate a court's judgment," and
that the determination of water rights did not require the federal
court to obtain in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the river. 4'
The dissent also found fault with the majority's factual assump-
tions, characterizing the majority's view that dismissal of the fed-
eral suit would avoid piecemeal litigation as "simply wrong."' 47 If
the federal suit were to reach judgment first, its decree easily could
be incorporated into the state court's water rights tabulation.' Fed-
eral court adjudication of the Government's claim would thus be
"neither more nor less 'piecemeal' than state court adjudication of
the same claims."' As additional factors militating in favor of the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, the dissent noted that some of the
issues in the suit related to federal law150 and that Indian claims
were involved. 51 In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens added the
presence of the United States as plaintiff as a factor supporting
retention of federal jurisdiction.'52
Although the case presented a highly unusual example of paral-
lel proceedings, the Court's discussion of the "principles governing
the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdiction" clearly
has broader implications.'53 The Court pointed out that the policy
considerations implicated in abstention cases differ from those rele-
vant to cases of parallel state-federal proceedings. 54 Abstention
" Id. at 822. This criticism of the majority's analogy to in rem cases is well-supported
by the caselaw. See, e.g., Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U.S. 613, 619 (1936).
"' 424 U.S. at 824.
" Id. at 824-25.
' Id. at 825. Professor Currie finds that the dissenters "had the better of the argument"
on this point. Currie, The Supreme Court and Federal Jurisdiction: 1975 Term, 1976 Sup.
CT. REV. 183, 214.
"' 424 U.S. at 825-26.
' The Court's traditional policy is to avoid state jurisdiction over Indians. Id.
"' Id. at 826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977). In Calvert the Seventh
Circuit overruled Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970), discussed in
text and notes at notes 96-97 supra. The court held that "[the rationale developed in Aetna
can no longer stand in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado River." 560 F.2d at
796. Rehearing en banc was denied in Calvert, but four judges who were not members of the
panel filed a statement indicating their belief that Aetna State Bank and Colorado River
could be reconciled. 560 F.2d at 796 n.5.
"I Several courts do not distinguish the two doctrines. See, e.g., Aetna State Bank v.
Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103, 106-07 (4th Cir.
1967); Universal Gypsum of Georgia, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824, 829
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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rests on principles of proper constitutional adjudication and on re-
gard for federal-state relationships, whereas federal court stays in
deference to pending state court proceedings are based on a concern
for "wise judicial administration." The Court concluded that while
concerns of judicial efficiency alone might justify stays to avoid
duplicative litigation in two federal courts, the obligation to exercise
federal jurisdiction outweighs such concerns when the parallel suit
is pending in a state court. The circuits that follow the pragmatic
view and defer readily to the discretion of the trial court in granting
stays had deemphasized this distinction and applied essentially the
same criteria in reviewing stays in deference to state court proceed-
ings as those applied to stays in deference to proceedings in another
federal court.'55
Colorado River's analysis of the considerations involved in de-
termining the existence of "exceptional circumstances" does sug-
gest a balancing test, but the considerations differ significantly from
those balanced by the circuit courts. On one side is the obligation
to exercise jurisdiction, and on the other the circumstances counsel-
ing against concurrent federal proceedings. As the Court's dissenters
pointed out, however, special factors that cut in favor of exercising
federal jurisdiction-factors such as the involvement of Indian
rights and the presence of the United States as plaintiff-should
also be considered. It may be true that "there is no scale in which
the balancing process called for . . . can take place";'!' Colorado
River itself provides little guidance on how its balancing test is
to be applied. 57 Some assistance, however, can be drawn from the
Supreme Court's treatment of concurrent jurisdiction problems in
related contexts.
' See text and notes at notes 104-110 supra.
"' C. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 275 (criticizing the balancing test offered in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)).
"I The Colorado River opinion expressly reserved opinion on even the most proximate
consequences of its analysis:
We need not decide, for example, whether, despite the McCarran Amendment, dismissal
would be warranted if more extensive proceedings had occurred in the District Court
prior to dismissal, if the involvement of state water rights were less extensive than it is
here, or if the state proceeding were in some respect inadequate to resolve the federal
claims.
Whether similar considerations would permit dismissal of a water suit brought by
a private party in federal district court is a question we need not now decide.
424 U.S. at 820 & n.26.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES STANDARD
The Supreme Court has approved stays or dismissals amount-
ing to a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction in circumstances
where it has discovered a strong countervailing policy embodied in
a federal statute or developed by the federal courts that counterbal-
ances the obligation to exercise jurisdiction. This development sug-
gests a rationale for the power to decline jurisdiction, a rationale
that can guide courts in the exercise of that power. The obligation
to exercise jurisdiction is based on the deference due the congres-
sional policy judgments that underlie the broadly drawn grants of
jurisdiction.'58 Courts will not inquire whether the policy justifica-
tion underlying the grant of jurisdiction applies in the particular
case. In a diversity suit, for example, a court does not ask whether
the defendant in that case needs to be protected from local bias. But
when a stay or dismissal would further a more particularized policy,
the obligation to exercise jurisdiction may be outweighed. The obli-
gation can also be overcome if Congress has indicated that the pol-
icy supporting the exercise of federal jurisdiction is not compelling
in the particular case. Thus, the consent to suit provision involved
in Colorado River arguably represented a Congressional judgment
that state courts are adequate to adjudicate federal interests in
water rights cases, and concomitantly that the policy underlying the
grant of jurisdiction where the United States sues as plaintiff is not
particularly compelling when the United States sues for a declara-
tion of its water rights. Similarly, in Langnes v. Green,'59 the savings
clause in the grant of admiralty jurisdiction expressed a judgment
that common law remedies should be preserved, and that policy
judgment supported a stay of the federal action where the exercise
of properly-invoked federal jurisdiction might result in the destruc-
tion of the federal defendant's common law rights.
This analysis of Colorado River, the Court's distinction be-
tween abstention and parallel jurisdiction doctrines notwithstand-
11 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (diversity of citizenship). See Bank of United States v. De-
veaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Mashall, C.J.); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928) (protection
of litigants from local bias).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (federal question). See Frankfurter, supra, at 509 (special federal
interest in protecting federal rights).
28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970) (United States as plaintiff). See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1927) (the federal government should be able to
"fashion its own judicial machinery for enforcing its claims and safeguarding its agents
against the obstructions and prejudices of local authorities").
1" 282 U.S. 531 (1931), discussed at text and notes at notes 73-75 supra.
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ing, suggests that the "exceptional circumstances" language means
essentially the same thing in both contexts: declining jurisdiction
is justified only if it is warranted by "some recognized public policy
or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction con-
ferred."'' 0 Stays should be granted only in those cases in which such
a policy or principle can be positively identified. The remainder of
this comment examines the implications of this analysis for the
treatment of certain common situations in which stays have hereto-
fore been thought appropriate.
A. Priority of Suit
1. Repetitive and Reactive Suits. Many courts that view stays
as largely within the discretion of the trial court have considered
temporal priority of suit as an important, indeed controlling, factor
in determining the propriety of a stay. Under certain circumstances,
priority of suit can also be considered an "exceptional circum-
stance" because congressional policy judgments implicit in the re-
strictions on the removal of causes from state to federal courts'"' can
be invoked to counterbalance the obligation to exercise jurisdiction.
These policies become relevant when a federal suit is brought after
the parallel state suit.
Repetitive federal suits arise when the plaintiff in an already
commenced state suit (SP) sues the state defendant (SD) in federal
court. The right to remove, however, is expressly limited to the
party or parties designated as defendants in the state suit; the plain-
tiff could not remove even if the defendant in the state court asserts
a federal defense or counterclaim. 62 This limitation arguably ex-
presses a policy determination that it is not unfair to make the
plaintiff abide by his initial choice of forum.' That policy should
counterbalance the obligation to exercise jurisdiction in the subse-
160 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). See text and notes at notes 49-
50 supra.
I The removal statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1451 (1970). Section 1441(a), the general
removal provision, provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
6 Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1894) (defense); Sham-
rock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1941) (counterclaim). The plaintiff
cannot remove by asserting that the counterclaim is a separate and independent cause of
action under § 1441(c). Lee Foods Div. v. Bucy, 105 F. Supp. 402, 404 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
263 Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. at 106-07 n.2 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1078,
49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886)).
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quent repetitive federal suit.
Reactive federal suits arise when SD sues SP in federal court
on a claim that either arises out of, or is intimately related to, the
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of SP's state suit,
or seeks a declaration that he is not liable on SP's claim. If the prior
state suit is removable, the interests of judicial economy dictate
that the federal suit should be stayed or dismissed, forcing SD to
employ the removal procedure. 6 ' Because access to the federal court
is not foreclosed, this result does not necessarily involve an abdica-
tion of the duty to exercise jurisdiction."5 Although the state defen-
dant is entitled to a federal forum, the avoidance of duplicative
litigation justifies declining the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction,
thus forcing the state defendant to use the more efficient and con-
venient method of removal. 66
If SP's claim is not removable and SD brings an action within
the original jurisdiction of the federal court, the propriety of a stay
depends on whether there is an articulable policy behind the una-
vailability of removal that indicates that the general policy underly-
ing the jurisdictional basis invoked by SD is not especially impor-
tant in the particular case. Where SD simply wishes to litigate the
validity of SP's claim in a federal forum and, removal being unavail-
able, brings an action for declaratory or injunctive relief to that
effect, 6 ' it is not particularly difficult to identify a policy judgment
in the restrictions on removal that might counterbalance the obliga-
tion to exercise jurisdiction.
An examination of three typical situations in which the state
suit is not removable but in which SD could bring a subsequent
" See Yale Note, supra note 92, at 988.
" See Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 704. This analysis is similar to that used to
justify the application of forum non conveniens, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947), discussed at text and notes at notes 38-47 supra, and the discretionary power of the
Supreme Court to decline to hear cases brought within its original jurisdiction. See note 89
supra.
I" If the defendant failed to employ the removal procedures and removal becomes time-
barred or waived, a stay would be warranted to prevent circumvention of the statutory
restrictions on removal. See Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 704.
"I See, e.g., PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973),
discussed at text and notes at notes 114-121 supra. If only declaratory relief is sought, Brill-
hart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), discussed at text and notes at notes 76-79 supra,
grants the federal court broad discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction. A request for
injunctive relief takes the case out of the Brillhart rule if the injunction sought is not merely
incidental to the declaratory relief sought. The grant of equity jurisdiction was not motivated
by the convenience and expediency considerations that led to the adoption of the declaratory
action, considerations that justify declining jurisdiction when it would be inconvenient to
assume it. See note 120 supra.
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federal suit will illustrate the analysis.'68 First, SD cannot remove a
claim brought against him by SP even though he has a defense
based on federal law. '69 This rule reflects a policy that the state
forum is adequate to adjudicate a state-based claim and any as-
serted defenses.'70 Second, if SP's claim against SD satisfies the
requirements for diversity jurisdiction, SD cannot remove if he is a
resident of the state in which the state suit was brought.' 7 ' The
congressional judgment behind the unavailability of removal in this
circumstance is that the defendant does not need the protection
from local bias that the diversity jurisdiction provides.'7 2 Third, if
SP's claim involves more than $10,000, and SP and SD are diverse,
removal is unavailable if the state suit involves other defendants not
diverse to SP, and SP's claim against SD is not separable and inde-
pendent.'73 Nonremovability in this context expresses a judgment
that SD does not require protection from possible local bias because
the possiblity of bias is minimal when the parties aligned on one side
of a state suit include among their members a nondiverse party. 7 4
In all these situations the same policy that justifies nonremovabil-
ity-the judgment that the state forum is adequate-can also coun-
terbalance the obligation to exercise jurisdiction in a reactive fed-
eral suit brought by SD seeking to adjudicate SP's claim in a federal
forum. 175
I" The list is not exhaustive. For example, another limitation on removal that would
support a stay is that which holds that when the action sought to be removed is premised on
diversity jurisdiction, diversity must exist at the time of the petition for removal and at the
time of the filing of the original complaint. See Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561 (1883). This
requirement is imposed to prevent the defendant from changing his domicile after the state
action is filed in order to create diversity for removal purposes. If the defendant acquires a
new domicile and then brings a reactive suit, the policy behind the nonavailability of removal
counterbalances the obligation to exercise jurisdiction.
"' Great Northern Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 281 (1918); Bailey v. Logan Square
Typographers, Inc., 441 F.2d 47, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1971).
I70 See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234 (1948) ("there is no need for the original jurisdiction when litigants
rely on federal rights to furnish them a shield but not a sword").
'" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970).
112 AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS § 1302(a), at 124 (1969) (commentary).
I" Separable and independent claim removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951) (a claim or cause of action is not
"separable or independent" from another claim "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff,
for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions").
I A similar policy judgment underlies the Strawbridge rule requiring complete diversity
in original jurisdiction cases. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. I), 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 22 (1968).
113 Cf. National Cancer Hosp. of America v. Webster, 251 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1958)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 824 (1959) ("An action under [the Declaratory Judgment
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The identification of policies in the limitations on removal that
can counterbalance the obligation to exercise jurisdiction is more
problematic in the case in which SD's federal suit asserts an affirm-
ative claim for relief on a cause of action arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject of SP's nonremovable
claim in state court. A defendant cannot remove a state suit on the
ground that he possesses a federally cognizable counterclaim. 7 '
However, if SD brings a federal action, the rules of claim and issue
preclusion will operate so that a judgment in either the state suit
(SP v. SD) or the subsequently-commenced federal suit (SD v. SP)
will, for all practical purposes, conclude the proceedings in the other
forum. 77 If the state proceeding reaches judgment prior to the
Act] is not the equivalent of a removal, and must satisfy the conditions imposed upon such
actions").
In suits for a declaratory judgment federal jurisdiction is determined as if the suit were
a coercive one. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1950);
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237, 241 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973). The federal courts therefore would not normally have
jurisdiction over SD's reactive suit if SD asserts a federal defense as the basis for nonliability
on SP's claim, SP's claim is based on state law, and SP and SD are not diverse. Even when
these circumstances are met, SD might yet be able to frame his claim to state a federal cause
of action, as in a civil rights suit seeking to restrain state civil proceedings. See text and notes
at notes 61-68 supra. One commentator's analysis of the effect of Colorado River in federal
civil rights cases concludes that the policy behind nonremovability on the basis of a federal
defense is "at least as strong" as the policy discerned in the McCarran Amendment in
Colorado River, thus warranting dismissal of a federal civil rights suit if the state proceeding
sought to be restrained was filed first. See Bartels, supra note 62, at 80-81. See also D. CuR-
RIE, FEDERAL JURISDIroN IN A NUTSHELL 180-81 (1976).
"I This is presumably because the original action is nt cognizable in the federal courts.
See Currie, supra note 2, at 274 & n.263. The rule h~s been much criticized, see, e.g.,
AMERICAN LAW INsTrrUTE, supra note 172, §§ 1312(a)(3), 1304(d), and proposals for amending
the Judicial Code to provide for removal have been introduced in Congress. Federal Court
Jurisdiction Act of 1971, S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 15088-96 (1971).
Several courts hold that the counterclaim may be considered in determining the amount
in controversy in the state case. For example, if the plaintiff sues a diverse defendant in state
court, claiming less than $10,000 damages, and the defendant counterclaims for more than
$10,000, the defendant would have the right to remove since the amount in controversy
exceeds $10,000. See, e.g., National Upholstery Co. v. Corley, 144 F. Supp. 658 (M.D.N.C.
1956); Lange v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 99 F. Supp. 1 (D. Iowa 1951). Professor Wright thinks
that it is "perfectly consistent with the statute to hold that a claim that arises from the
transaction sued on and that, by the relevant state law, must either be asserted in the action
or forever barred, is in controversy." C. WmGrrr, supra note 48, at 144. The majority of courts
reject this analysis. See, e.g., Cabe v. Pennwalt Corp., 372 F. Supp. 780 (W.D.N.C. 1974);
West Virginia State Bar v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.W. Va. 1972). Professor Moore
supports this position, relying on the intent of Congress to limit removal jurisdiction and the
argument that federal removal practice should not be dependent on state procedural rules
determining the status of a counterclaim as permissive or compulsory. 1A MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTIcE T 0.167181, at 409 (2d ed. 1974).
"I Claim preclusion would conclude the federal proceedings were the state suit to reach
judgment first, as the claim asserted in federal court would be a compulsory counterclaim in
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federal suit, the federal proceeding will have been utterly wasteful;
if the federal suit reaches judgment first, SD may accomplish the
effect of removal-federal adjudication of the controversy--even
though removal itself is not available. To ascribe a policy judgment
to the nonavailability of removal in this situation, however, would
be to say that the policy justifications underlying the grants of juris-
diction are in some mysterious way diminished simply because the
events forming the basis of the federally cognizable claim also give
rise to a state cause of action and the state claim happened to be
filed first. The only possible justification for the rule that a defen-
dant cannot remove on the basis of a counterclaim is to prevent the
abuse of filing a barely colorable counterclaim in state court in order
to effect removal. This justification is essentially unrelated to the
importance of exercising of federal jurisdiction in most cases, and
the unavailability of removal in this situation therefore has little or
no relevance to the propriety of a stay.17 8
Nevertheless, there will be cases where the policy underlying
the nonremovability of SP's claim is applicable despite SD's asser-
tion of an affirmative cause of action in federal court. For example,
if removal on the basis of diversity of citizenship is not available
because SD is a resident of the state in which the state suit was
brought, and hence does not in theory need protection from local
bias, the policy judgment underlying the restriction on removal
should usually warrant staying a subsequently commenced federal
suit and thus effectively requiring SD to submit his counterclaim
for adjudication in the state court. 7'
the state suit. See note 1 supra. A judgment first on the federal claim would not necessarily
conclude the state proceedings. SP would not be required to assert his claim against SD in
the federal suit under FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), which provides that a counterclaim is not
compulsory if "at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action." It is likely, however, that SP would assert his claim, if only to protect
himself. See Feinberg, Establishing Jurisdictional Amount by a Counterclaim, 21 Mo. L. REv.
243, 250 (1956). Moreover, if the same facts constitute both a ground for defense in the state
suit and for the counterclaim, issue preclusion would apply to conclude the state litigation.
For example, in City of Ironton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 212 F. 353 (6th Cir. 1914), the city
sued the construction company for breach of contract in state court, and the company then
sued the city in federal court alleging breach of the same contract. The federal judgment
would conclude the state suit whether or not the city asserted its counterclaim in the subse-
quent federal action.
"I The Congressional design thus actually encourages duplicative litigation by creating
a class of cases in which neither party to a state suit can remove but one of the litigants is
entitled to bring an original action in federal court and gamble on winning a race to judgment.
Whichever court wins the race will effectively decide the controversy-hardly a reasonable
or principled way to effect the division of responsibility between the federal and state courts.
The proper solution would appear to be an amendment to the removal statutes. See note 176
supra.
"I See Universal Gypsum of Georgia, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824
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In sum, the above analysis suggests that in determining the
propriety of a stay in a repetitive or reactive federal suit instituted
subsequent to a state suit involving the same issues and parties, the
federal court should first determine if the state suit is removable. If
it is, a stay should be granted. If it is not, the court should then
determine why removal is unavailable. If nonremovability can be
said to express a policy judgment that the state forum is adequate
to decide the controversy, and therefore that the policies underlying
the jurisdictional grant invoked by the federal plaintiff are not very
strong in the particular case, then the federal action should ordinar-
ily be stayed. 10
2. Class Actions and Derivative Suits. Another type of dupli-
cative federal suit arises when a federal plaintiff class action in-
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Universal Gypsum the parallel actions involved the construction of the
same contract. Cyanamid's New York state court action was initially removed to federal
district court, but remanded to state court upon a finding that Gypsum was a citizen of New
York under the diversity statute. The federal court stayed Gypsum's reactive suit, articulat-
ing the rule that
when a federal diversity action raising only state law issues has been commenced at a
time when a previously or simultaneously commenced action is pending in the courts of
his own state, involving the same parties and issues, the district court, absent some
persuasive reason for contrary action, should stay the proceedings before it until the
state court has had the opportunity to pass upon the claim.
390 F. Supp. at 830. Although the court in Gypsum did not remark upon the policies implicit
in the limitations on removal it did note that "Gypsum's invocation of diversity jurisdiction
is without support in the primary purposes and theoretical basis of that grant of adjudicatory
authority." Id. at 828.
"I Application of the Erie doctrine may require dismissal of a subsequent federal action
under certain circumstances. See generally Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 693-98, dis-
cussing cases in which an action is brought in federal court in a state whose courts would
stay or dismiss the suit in deference to a pending action in the same or a different state. Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), requires a court to balance the
policies behind the conflicting federal and state rules in making the Erie decision. Concluding
that the state policy behind a rule mandating a stay or dismissal is primarily one of conserv-
ing state judicial resources, the Note argues that Erie does not require the federal court to
apply the state rule. The federal policy underlying the provision of a federal forum more than
outweighs the state policy.
When the state rule mandating dismissal of the subsequent suit has a purpose other than
the efficient management of litigation in the state courts, the Erie question becomes more
problematic. In Amy v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 163 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1958), appeal
dismissed, 266 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1959), the district court ordered a stay in a wrongful death
action in deference to pending death and survival actions in state court because Pennsylvania
law required wrongful death and survival actions to be consolidated. The alleged purpose of
the state rule was to avoid overlapping remedies, and the court labeled the defendant's right
to protection against double recovery a "substantive" right. Id. at 955. That analysis, how-
ever, had been previously considered and rejected by a different district court, see Krivan v.
Hourican, 117 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Pa. 1954), and has been criticized by commentators. See
Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 692 n.57. The Krivan court noted that proper jury instruc-
tions would adequately protect the defendant. Under this view, the only substantial purpose
of the state rule is judicial convenience, and Erie does not require dismissal.
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volves substantially the same class, defendants, and issues as a
previously commenced class suit in state court. When the named
plaintiffs18' or motivating forces 8 2 in the two suits are the same, the
policy underlying the rule that plaintiffs cannot remove-a judg-
ment that it is not unfair to restrict the plaintiff to his initial choice
of forum-argues for a stay of the action. 183 When the federal and
state suits are brought by different plaintiffs, however, the federal
plaintiff did not make the initial choice of forum. An explanation
of the provisions governing class actions' 84 and stockholder deriva-
tive suits185 indicates that under certain circumstances a stay is
nevertheless appropriate.
A court has some discretion over the maintenance of certain
class actions. To certify a "common question" class action under
rule 23(b)(3), a court must find that "a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy."'' 86 One of the four factors listed as pertinent to that
determination is "the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class."'' 8 1 Several courts have invoked this factor in refusing to cer-
tify a class action when other related class suits are pending.' 8 The
common question class action can be viewed as a device for achiev-
ing comprehensive and efficient adjudication of related claims.' 8 A
duplicative class action undercuts the economies that would other-
wise be realized, and is typically unnecessary to avoid the ineffici-
encies of individual litigation. 10
That substantial attorneys' fees are awarded those who success-
fully prosecute certain class actions and derivative suits also sup-
,' See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1341 (2d Cir. 1971).
See, e.g., Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1949); Georgia Ass'n
of Educators v. Harris, 403 F. Supp. 961, 963-64 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (same attorneys, although
different named plaintiffs).
' See text and notes at notes 162-163 supra.




" Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 107 (10th Cir. 1971); Barkel v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D. 504, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"I See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HAv. L. Rv. 1318, 1341-42 (1976);
Advisory Committee's Note, 1966 Amendments, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ("Subdivision (b)(3)
encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without
sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.").
11o A refusal to allow the action is therefore justified by the policies of Rule 23. This
analysis is similar to that used to justify stays when federal jurisdiction is invoked pursuant
to the Declaratory Judgment Act. See text and notes at notes 76-79 supra.
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ports the exercise of the power to stay. 9 ' The award of attorneys'
fees reflects a public policy in favor of such suits as a means to
redress small claims and, in the case of derivative actions, to control
corporate management.'9 2 If a subsequently filed federal class action
or derivative suit is not stayed, however, the plaintiff who filed first
could lose such fees if the federal court reaches judgment first. This
situation presents great possibilities for unfairness, since the first
plaintiff may have incurred substantial expenses,'93 and the second
plaintiff may have simply plagiarized the first plaintiff's com-
plaint.'94 A final characteristic of class and derivative actions, the
high incidence of strike suits,'95 also argues in favor of the power to
stay."9 The availability of two forums in which to litigate a class
action or derivative suit unnecessarily increases the nuisance value
of threatened litigation.
These considerations-the efficiency justification for class
action treatment and the heightened possibilities of unfairness in
multiple class proceedings-invite a finding of exceptional circum-
stances within the Colorado River standard. Such a finding should
be conditioned on a determination that the federal plaintiffs are
adequately represented in the state suit'97 and that the state suit
is proceeding normally.'9 8
When an individual federal court action is predicated on a
claim that is also the subject of a class action already pending in
state court, the general priority rule is subject to qualification. If the
"' See Yale Note, supra note 92, at 989-90.
112 See generally Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1611
(1976); Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 77-82 (1967).
" The expense may be especially high if the plaintiff is required to pay the cost of notice
to all members of the class. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 'U.S. 156, 173-77
(1974).
' See Yale Note, supra note 92, at 989 n.48.
" See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 75 (1967).
' In Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103, 107 (4th Cir. 1967), the court noted that stays in
stockholder derivative suits were especially justifiable because of the "inconvenience, loss of
time, and expense inflicted upon the corporate defendant, and the danger that its treasury
may be depleted by litigation supposedly prosecuted for its benefit." See also Rosenfeld v.
Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971).
" If the federal plaintiff has the right to intervene and participate in the state suit, the
concern regarding adequate representation in the state action is less important. See Weiss v.
Doyle, 178 F. Supp. 566, 568-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 709.
"s The possibility of collusion between the class plaintiffs and the defendant in the state
suit cannot be disregarded. See Yale Note, supra note 92, at 985. The federal class action rule
provides for court supervision of settlements. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). If the state class action
rule governing the parallel action contains no comparable provision, and the federal plaintiff
makes a colorable showing of possible collusion, the federal action should be allowed to
proceed.
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federal plaintiff opts out of the state class action under the state's
rule, a stay should not be granted.'99 If he does not opt out, he has
in effect chosen the state forum, and a stay of the federal action is
warranted. However, if the state class action rule does not permit
the class members to opt out, the federal plaintiffs individual suit
should ordinarily be allowed to proceed. Because the federal plain-
tiff has not chosen the state forum, the policy analysis of the re-
moval statutes and the special considerations regarding class action
or derivative suits do not apply.
B. The Avoidance of Piecemeal Litigation
In Colorado River, the Supreme Court included the avoidance
of piecemeal litigation as a consideration relevant to determining
the propriety of a stay."" The policy against piecemeal litigation has
been given significant weight in the development of the doctrines of
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. 0 ' These doctrines empower a
federal court, in the interests of "judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to litigants, ' 22 to assume jurisdiction over claims that
do not independently satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. When
these interests are advanced to justify declining federal jurisdiction
rather than to justify exercising it, however, Colorado River's impli-
cation that concerns about judicial economy cannot overcome the
"I See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), providing that the notice required in (b)(3) class
actions "shall advise each member that . . . the court will exclude him from the class if he
so requests by a specified date."
If the plaintiff has opted out, he may not take advantage of the class judgment through
issue preclusion, even in those jurisdictions that have abandoned the mutuality requirement.
See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 354; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure I, 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 391 n.136
(1967). Once the federal plaintiff opts out of the state class action, his individual suit and
the state class action are no longer true parallel suits. See note 1 supra.
424 U.S. at 818. See also Thompson v. Boyle, 417 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1969) (federal
suit's lack of comprehensiveness is a "compelling reason" for a stay), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
972 (1970); Reiter v. Universal Marian Corp., 173 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1959), vacated as
moot, 273 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
2' The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction allows the federal court to assume jurisdiction
over a case in its entirety and to decide matters that are incidental to the disposition of the
issue properly before it even if the ancillary matters do not independently satisfy the jurisdic-
tional requirements. See Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 708,
712-13 (5th Cir. 1970); C. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 21-24; Goldberg, The Influence of Proce-
dural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REv. 395, 415-31 (1976).
Pendent jurisdiction permits state claims to be joined in federal suits that concern closely
related federal claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent
jurisdiction established when the federal and state claims "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact"); C. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 72-77.
2I United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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obligation to exercise jurisdiction2"3 seems applicable. The greater
comprehensiveness of the parallel state suit therefore should not
itself constitute an exceptional circumstance. Indeed, application of
the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jusrisdiction could in some
cases broaden the scope of the federal suit so that the federal court
would be an equally efficient forum."4
Although the probability of piecemeal litigation cannot consti-
tute an exceptional circumstance, it will sometimes work in tandem
with the removal policies to support a stay. For example, when the
prior state suit involves state claims between parties who are not
completely diverse and one of the diverse defendants brings a reac-
tive federal suit less comprehensive than the state suit,2 5 both the
removal policy and piecemeal litigation policy would strongly coun-
sel a finding of exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant stay-
ing the federal suit.
On the other hand, the two policies will sometimes conflict.
When a plaintiffs federal action is more comprehensive than a prior
nonremovable state suit in which he is named as a defendant, the
desire to avoid piecemeal litigation might lead the federal court to
deny a stay even if the nonremovability of the state suit represents
a policy judgment supporting declining jurisdiction. If the factual
issues common to both suits are separable from many of the issues
that are before the federal court only, a stay of the federal proceed-
ings could be limited to the common issues.2 8 The difficulty arises
in cases where the factual inquiries are intertwined. In such a situa-
tion, the policy against piecemeal litigation points toward denying
the stay: to stay the federal suit would be to decline jurisdiction in
10 See text and notes at notes 134-136, 153-155 supra.
210 See, e.g., Chintala v. Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Chintala brought a diversity suit in federal court seeking damages against Diamond Reo
under the Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival statutes. Two weeks later Chintala
commenced an action in Pennsylvania state court for similar relief, but named a different
defendant. The state defendant brought in four other defendants, including Diamond Reo.
Diamond Reo threatened to bring in the four other state defendants as third-party defendants
in the federal action. Although ancillary jurisdiction attaches to cross-claims and the federal
suit could have been broadened, the district court stayed the federal suit on the ground that
the state proceedings were more comprehensive than the federal suit.
Jurisdictional requirements such as complete diversity will often make pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction unavailable to cure the federal suit's lack of comprehensiveness. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Boyle, 417 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 72 F.R.D. 33, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (federal court in New York
could not obtain personal jurisdiction of parties over whom the California state court had
already assumed jurisdiction).
See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973).
24 See, e.g., Lane v. Hills, 72 F.R.D. 158, 160 (D.N.J. 1976); United States v. Finn, 127
F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D. Cal. 1954), modified, 239 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1956).
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favor of a less comprehensive suit, thus ensuring a piecemeal resolu-
tion of the controversy. The possibility of piecemeal litigation will
remain, however, even if the stay is denied, since the state suit could
reach judgment before the federal suit-a likely result in view of the
priority of the state suit and the greater comprehensiveness of the
federal proceedings.
This conflict can be resolved by viewing the propriety of. a stay
as dependent on the degree to which the federal proceeding is more
comprehensive than the parallel state action. If it is significantly
more comprehensive, the presumption underlying the nonremova-
bility of the state suit-the adequacy of the state forum-is rebut-
ted, and the motion for a stay should be denied.2 17 Moreover, the
presence of additional parties and issues before the federal court
lessens the likelihood of unnecessary duplication of effort. Since
parties not before the state court will not be bound by the state
court judgment, relitigation of the factual issues in federal court is
inevitable and cannot be avoided by a stay. In addition, duplication
of effort may be avoided altogether since the state court might stay
the proceedings before it in deference to the more comprehensive
federal suit.28
C. The Relative Convenience of the Federal Forum
Another factor listed in the Colorado River opinion as relevant
to the appropriateness of a stay or dismissal is "the inconvenience
of the federal forum.12 19 If the federal forum is an inconvenient
location for the litigation, the less drastic remedy of transfer 0 will
typically cure the inconvenience. But when the federal court is sub-
stantially more convenient than the state forum, policies favoring a
stay of the federal action may be overridden. Because the adequacy
of the state forum is doubtful, the stay should not be granted. Fur-
thermore, the state court might decide to invoke the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and dismiss the suit before it.2 "
"0 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 672 (2d Cir. 1961); Kahan v. Rosenstiel,
285 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1968); Levy v. Alexander, 170 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
2" See, e.g., Moeckel v. Delaware Engineering & Design Corp., 366 A.2d 507 (Del. 1976).
See text and notes at notes 21-24 supra.
21 424 U.S. at 818.
210 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). The Court in Colorado River notes the geographic distance
between the district court and the court in Division 7 as one of the "significant" factors
supporting dismissal. 424 U.S. at 820. As the dissenters point out, however, the district court
was authorized to sit in Durango, the headquarters of Division 7. Id. at 823-24 n.6. The
convenience factors should weigh heavily in favor of a stay or dismissal only in cases in which
no available federal forum is convenient. See text at note 47 supra.
"I1 See, e.g., American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 695
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D. Miscellaneous Factors
It is impossible to construct an exhaustive list of the factors
that might be pertinent to determining whether exceptional circum-
stances exist-a discussion of the issue prior to Colorado River
would have been unlikely to spot the relevance of the McCarran
Amendment. Another example of a unique policy operative in a
small number of cases is provided by the case of Scott v. Germano. 2 1 2
The Germano case will serve to suggest the variety of considerations
potentially involved.
In Germano, the Supreme Court ordered the district court to
vacate its orders invalidating the apportionment of the Illinois Sen-
ate. The orders required the defendants to submit any proposed
implementation or amendment of the apportionment laws to the
court for approval and, if they submitted no such changes, to show
cause why the senators should not be elected on an at-large basis.
The Court also directed the district court to stay the proceedings
before it in deference to an Illinois Supreme Court ruling invalidat-
ing the apportionment. Although the district court had plenary
jurisdiction, the Court held that the policy of encouraging
"appropriate action by the States" in apportionment cases dictated
that the district court refrain from further exercise of that jurisdic-
tion.21 3 Although both the federal and state courts had reached judg-
ment in Germano, the policy favoring deference to state court pro-
ceedings that the Court relied upon would seem equally pertinent
to the stay issue in cases of concurrent state and federal apportion-
ment challenges. That policy consideration would arguably warrant
staying the federal suit.
Even when a policy counterbalancing the obligation to exercise
jurisdiction can be identified, whether it be a policy underlying the
removal statutes or a more particularized policy like those in
Colorado River or Germano, other factors might favor the exercise
of jurisdiction. The implicit categorical assumption that the state
forum is adequate may be rebutted in individual cases by, among
(D.V.I. 1976), a reactive suit filed in the District of the Virgin Islands. Despite the pendency
of a prior suit filed in a Puerto Rican court, the district judge refused to stay the federal action
because the events giving rise to the litigation centered in the Virgin Islands, Virgin Island
law would apply under choice of law rules, and other, related lawsuits were pending before
him. He concluded, "I find it hard to believe that judicial economy and litigants' interests
would not better be served by the Puerto Rican court staying its own proceedings." Id. at
698. See Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash. 2d 124, 134-35, 338 P.2d 747, 752-
53 (1959) (collecting state forum non conveniens cases).
212 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
211 Id. at 409.
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other factors, the exclusiveness of federal jurisdiction, the prejudice
likely to result from the absence of federal procedure, or the exist-
ence of circumstances justifying the duplicative suit.214 When fed-
eral jurisdiction is based on an exclusive grant, such as those in the
Securities Act of 1934215 or the Clayton Act,26 the desire for uniform
and effective administration of the federal statute should lead
courts to resist stay motions even though other factors favoring a
stay are present.217 Federal courts should also consider the proce-
21' Several courts have considered the res judicata effect a nonjury state determination
would have on a federal litigant's right to jury trial. See, e.g., Lecor, Inc. v. United States
Dist. Ct., 502 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1974); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 832-33
(9th Cir. 1963). See Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REv. 11, 26-27 (1961). The seventh
amendment right to jury trial has not been extended to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974).
Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971), suggests
that principles of collateral estoppel would not apply if the state court reached judgment prior
to the federal suit. The court held that a party could not lose his constitutional right to jury
trial through application of collateral estoppel based on a prior injunctive action brought by
the SEC, an equitable, nonjury proceeding. Rachal has been heavily criticized, however. See
Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973) (dictum)
(Friendly, J.); Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442 (1971); Comment, The Use of Government Judgments
in Private Antitrust Litigation: Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial,
43 U. CHI. L. REv. 338, 369-71 (1976). The Second Circuit implicitly rejected Rachal in
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974).
Even if the seventh amendment does not require the denial of the stay, an affirmative
federal policy favoring jury trial should be sufficient to warrant exercising federal jurisdiction.
Whether such a policy exists independent of the seventh amendment is not yet settled.
Compare Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974) (acknowledging that policy considera-
tions may call for curtailment of the right to a jury trial) with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958).
2,5 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
21 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
"I See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977); Cotler v. Inter-County
Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A., 526 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1975); McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank,
519 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1975); Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 700. Some courts have even
held that the judgment of a state court may not be given res judicata effect in a suit brought
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, e.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). The modern trend is to
reject that holding. See, e.g., Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 81 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970); Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510, 512-13
(3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957). See generally Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. Rxv. 1360
(1967).
Section 1345 jurisdiction, governing civil claims brought by the United States, is another
situation in which federal jurisdiction should rarely be relinquished. See United States v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 422 F. Supp. 676, 679 (D. Md. 1976). The Anti-Injunction Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), does not apply to injunctions sought by the United States. Leiter
Minerals, Inc. v.' United States, 352 U.S. 220, 224-25 (1957). The considerations that
prompted this construction-that the federal government should be able to "fashion its own
judicial machinery for enforcing its claims and safeguarding its agents against the obstruc-
Federal Stays after Colorado River
dural advantages available to litigants in the federal forum.218 Sev-
eral courts have conditioned stays on the use of federal discovery in
the state suit;219 commentators have justifiably criticized the prac-
tice.2 If the deprivation of federal procedure will severely disadvan-
tage the federal plaintiff, the court should refuse a stay regardless
of other factors counterbalancing the obligation to exercise jurisdic-
tion.2 2' Finally, duplicative litigation may be justified in some in-
stances.2 22 For example, a reactive suit may be justified if the state
plaintiff acted in bad faith in bringing suit in state court.22a
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that the "exceptional circum-
stances" standard announced by the Supreme Court in Colorado
River for determining the propriety of stays and dismissals in
deference to parallel state court proceedings is consistent with the
Court's prior decisions on related jurisdictional problems. Before
Colorado River, a number of lower federal courts adopted a broad
discretionary standard relating to stays, relying on practical con-
siderations,24 an expansive reading of Supreme Court precedent,22
tions and prejudices of local authorities," F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT 10 (1927)-also apply when the defendant seeks a stay in a § 1345 suit. See
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 826 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 816 n.23 (reserving the question of whether abstention would ever be
appropriate where the United States is a party in the federal suit). The issue will rarely arise,
since the United States is not likely to sue as plaintiff in both federal and state courts, see
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 9 (1973), and must consent to be sued
as defendant in state court, as in Colorado River.
2, See Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 705-06; Yale Note, supra note 92, at 984.
2,, See, e.g., Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1970); Mottolese
v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
2 Columbia Note, supra note 104, at 706; Yale Note, supra note 92, at 986-88. See note
92 supra.
22' See, e.g., Levy v. Alexander, 170 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). See also note 198
supra.
See Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. REv. 525, 535-36 (1960); Vestal, Reactive
Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REv. 11, 24 (1961).
2 In Applegate v. Devitt, 509 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1975), for example, the federal plaintiff
resisted the defendant's stay motion on the ground that the defendant had brought the earlier
state suit for the sole purpose of delaying the plaintiff's prosecution of his claim. After
indicating his interest in a settlement the defendant filed suit in an Illinois state court, where
a five year delay would have resulted if Applegate wished to have his counterclaim tried by
a jury. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's stay order and remanded with instruc-
tions to consider the defendant's "bad faith 'stalling' tactics" in ruling on its motion to stay.
Id. at 109.
21 See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1975); Aetna
State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103,
107 (4th Cir. 1967); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949).
2n See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1975); Aetna
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and analogies to situations in which stays do not result in the abro-
gation of federal jurisdiction." 8 The Court's opinion in Colorado
River implicitly disapproves that approach and emphasizes the fed-
eral courts' unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given
them.
The exceptional circumstances standard requires the presence
of a countervailing policy, or a principle guiding the exercise of the
jurisdiction invoked, before a federal court may stay or dismiss the
proceedings before it. This comment has suggested that such poli-
cies and principles can be found in the limitations on the removal
of causes from state to federal courts and in the rules governing class
action and derivative suits. The analysis has demonstrated that the
exceptional circumstances required under Colorado River need not
be limited to relatively unique policies like that which the Court
identified in the McCarran Amendment; however, it has also shown
that there are definite limits to the discretionary power of federal
courts to decline jurisdiction. Stays can be an important means of
regulating duplicative litigation and avoiding waste of judicial ener-
gies, but should not be used to deprive litigants of a federal forum
absent strong reason in policy or principle for doing so.
Michael M. Wilson
State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103,
106-07 (4th Cir. 1967); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1949).
22 See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1975); Aetna
State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755-56 (7th Cir. 1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103,
106 (4th Cir. 1967); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949).
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